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mispricing, and prices can violate familiar volatility bounds when investors are rational. Cross-
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1. Introduction 
  There is now much evidence that stock returns are predictable.  At the aggregate level, Fama and 
Schwert (1977), Keim and Stambaugh (1986), Fama and French (1989), and Kothari and Shanken (1997) 
find that interest rates, dividend yield, aggregate book-to-market, and the default premium forecast time-
variation in expected returns.  Further, LeRoy and Porter (1981) and Shiller (1981) argue that the 
volatility of stock prices is too high to be explained by a model with constant discount rates, providing 
indirect evidence that expected returns change over time.  At the firm level, Fama and French (1992) 
conclude that size and book-to-market together explain much of the cross-sectional variation in average 
returns.  Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) show that past returns also contain information about expected 
returns.  In sum, there seems little doubt that expected returns vary both cross-sectionally and over time.
1 
  The interpretation of predictability, however, is more contentious.  The empirical results are 
potentially consistent with either market efficiency or irrational mispricing.  In general terms, market 
efficiency implies that prices ‘fully reflect all available information.’  To formalize this idea for empirical 
testing, Fama (1976) distinguishes between the probability distribution of returns perceived by ‘the 
market,’ based on whatever information investors view as relevant, and the true distribution of returns 
conditional on all information.  The market is said to be informationally efficient if these distributions are 
the same.  As an obvious consequence, market efficiency implies that investors correctly anticipate any 
cross-sectional or time-variation in true expected returns.  While Fama’s definition ignores potentially 
important issues like heterogeneous beliefs, it provides a useful framework for thinking about a broad set 
of asset-pricing questions. 
Market efficiency is closely related to the ‘rational expectations’ property analyzed by Muth (1961) 
and Lucas (1978).  In Lucas’s model, asset prices are a function of the current level of output, whose 
behavior over time is known by investors.  Consumers make investment decisions based, in part, on their 
                                                   
1 Clearly, this list of empirical papers and predictive variables is not meant to be exhaustive, and a considerable 
amount of subsequent research extends, confirms, and critiques these findings.  See Fama (1991) for a more 
complete survey of the evidence.   2 
expectations of future prices.  Rational expectations requires that the pricing function implied by 
consumer behavior (the true pricing function) is the same as the pricing function on which decisions are 
based (the perceived pricing function).  Lucas shows that rational expectations can, and generally will, 
give rise to predictable variation in expected returns (see also LeRoy, 1973).  Intuitively, changes in 
economic conditions will lead to changes in the discount rate and, consequently, predictable returns.  
Thus, researchers must judge whether the empirical patterns in returns are consistent with credible models 
of rational behavior or can be better explained by irrational mispricing. 
  In this paper, we argue that there is a third potential source of return predictability:  estimation risk.  
In the asset-pricing literature, estimation risk refers to investor uncertainty about the parameters of the 
return- or cashflow-generating process.  Because investors do not know the true distribution, they must 
estimate the parameters using whatever information is available, which can be formally modeled using 
Bayesian analysis.  The parameter uncertainty increases the perceived risk in the economy and necessarily 
influences portfolio decisions.  As a consequence, estimation risk affects equilibrium prices and expected 
returns, and further, we show that it can be a source of predictability in a way that differs from other 
models with rational investors. 
  The theoretical literature on estimation risk typically focuses on the subjective distribution perceived 
by investors.  The subjective distribution combines investors’ prior beliefs with the information contained 
in observed data.  This distribution represents investors’ best guess about future returns or cash flows, and 
is therefore relevant for investment decisions.
2  Our paper emphasizes instead the true distributions of 
prices and returns which arise endogenously in equilibrium.  The true distribution simply refers to the 
actual, or observable, distribution from which prices or returns are drawn.  Under the standard definition 
of market efficiency, the true and subjective distributions are the same.  However, that definition goes 
well beyond the intuitive notion that prices fully reflect available information, and implicitly assumes that 
investors know the parameters of the cashflow process.  In the presence of estimation risk, the two 
                                                   
2 See Zellner (1971) and Berger (1985) for a general introduction to Bayesian analysis and Bawa, Brown, and 
Klein (1979) for an application to portfolio theory.  Jobson, Korkie, and Ratti (1979), Jorion (1985), Kandel and 
Stambaugh (1996), Stambaugh (1998), and Barberis (1999) also discuss portfolio choice when investors must   3 
distributions necessarily differ since the true distribution depends on the unknown parameters.  We should 
stress that ‘true’ does not mean ‘exogenous’:  the true distribution of returns must be endogenous because 
prices clearly depend on investors’ beliefs. 
Our central result is easy to summarize:  with estimation risk, the observable properties of prices and 
returns can differ significantly from the properties perceived by rational investors.  For example, returns 
can appear predictable based on standard empirical tests even when they are not predictable by rational 
investors.  The reason is simply that empirical tests estimate the true properties of returns, and these 
properties will typically differ from those under the subjective distribution.  An example should help 
illustrate the point.  Suppose dividends are normally distributed and independent over time with unknown 
mean  δ  and known variance σ
2 (in our parlance, this is the true distribution).  From the investors’ 
perspective, the mean of the dividend process is random, represented by a posterior belief about δ .  
However, for an empirical test, the process that generates actual dividends has a fixed, constant mean.  
The sampling distribution of any statistic calculated from dividends – say, an autocorrelation coefficient −  
depends only on this true distribution.  In a similar way, the true distribution of returns is relevant for 
empirical tests even when it is unknown.  To put the idea a bit differently, returns can be predictable 
under the true distribution, when they are not predictable by investors, since this distribution conditions 
on unknown information.  We show that standard empirical tests, like predictive regressions and volatility 
tests, can in principle detect this predictability. 
  We develop these ideas in a simple overlapping-generations model of capital market equilibrium.  
Investors have imperfect knowledge about an exogenous dividend process, and they estimate the 
parameters based on current and past cash flows.  For simplicity, we initially assume that all parameters 
are constant over time.  We later extend the model to incorporate periodic shocks to the dividend process, 
in which case investors never fully learn the true distribution.  Throughout, investors are assumed to be 
rational and use all available information when making decisions.  As long as estimates of expected cash 
flows diverge from the true values, asset prices deviate from their values in the absence of estimation risk.  
                                                                                                                                                                    
estimate expected returns.   4 
However, prices tend to move toward these ‘fundamental’ values over time as investors update their 
beliefs.  Through this process of updating, parameter uncertainty affects the predictability, volatility, and 
cross-sectional distribution of returns. 
  The model shows that estimation risk can induce return behavior that resembles irrational 
mispricing.  In our benchmark model without estimation risk, returns are unpredictable using past 
information.  When investors must estimate the mean of the cashflow process, returns become predictable 
based on past dividends, prices, and returns.  For example, when investors begin with a diffuse prior over 
the mean of the dividend process, stock prices appear to react too strongly to realized dividends, and 
returns become negatively related to past dividends and prices.  In a fairly general sense, it appears that 
this phenomenon is inherent in a model with estimation risk because investors’ ‘mistakes’ eventually 
reverse as they learn more about the underlying parameters.  However, the predictability induced by 
estimation risk can take the form of either reversals or continuations (or neither), depending on investors’ 
prior beliefs and on the underlying cashflow process (we discuss these issues further in Section 6).  When 
investors have prior information about the dividend process, they may appear to react too slowly to new 
information, giving rise to momentum. 
Predictability in the model is fundamentally different from predictability in other models with 
rational investors, such as that of Lucas (1978).  The difference is illustrated most easily by considering 
the case of risk-neutral investors.  In a model with perfect information, excess stock returns must be 
unpredictable if investors are risk-neutral.  This does not have to be true with estimation risk.  We show 
that excess stock returns can be predictable, under the true distribution, even with rational, risk-neutral 
investors.  This predictability is consistent with rational expectations because investors do not know the 
true distribution; nonetheless, the predictability can be detected by standard empirical tests.  To reiterate 
our earlier point, excess returns remain unpredictable from the perspective of rational investors, but 
empirical tests estimate the true, not the subjective, distribution. 
  The example with risk-neutral investors shows that some basic properties of asset prices do not hold 
with estimation risk.  Most importantly, investor rationality no longer implies that return surprises must   5 
be uncorrelated with any element of investors’ information set.  In fact, return surprises will often be 
correlated with past prices if investors must estimate expected cash flows.  The idea is simple.  Suppose 
that prices equal the discounted present value of expected future dividends, assumed to be independent 
and identically distributed over time, and assume that investors do not know the mean of the dividend 
process.  If a representative investor’s estimate at a given point in time is, say, higher than the true mean, 
the price of the stock will be inflated above its ‘fundamental’ value.  Furthermore, future dividends will 
be drawn from a true distribution with a lower mean than the market’s estimate, and investors will, on 
average, perceive a negative surprise over the subsequent period.  It follows that relatively high prices 
predict relatively low future returns. 
This story resembles the standard mispricing argument, but with some important differences.  Given 
estimation risk, the reversals are driven by completely rational behavior on the part of investors.  The 
reversals arise precisely because prices do fully reflect all available information at each point in time.  In 
fact, investors know that returns are negatively autocorrelated but cannot take advantage of it.  They 
would want to exploit this pattern by investing more aggressively when the market’s best estimate is less 
than the true mean of the dividend process, but of course they cannot know when this is the case.  In 
contrast, DeLong, Shleifer, Summers, and Waldmann (1990), Daniel, Hirshleifer, and Subramanyam 
(1998), and Barberis, Shleifer, and Vishny (1998) generate return predictability by assuming irrationality 
on the part of investors.  Investors misperceive the true return-generating process because of behavioral 
biases, not because they have imperfect information about returns. 
  The discussion has emphasized the time-series properties of returns.  We also examine the cross 
section of expected returns.  Curiously, for many years the conventional wisdom has been that estimation 
risk is largely irrelevant for equilibrium, although it is important for individual portfolio selection.  For 
example, Bawa and Brown (1979) argue that estimation risk does not affect market betas or the expected 
return on the market portfolio.  They conclude that 
‘in empirical testing of equilibrium pricing models, one should not necessarily be concerned with the 
problem of estimation risk – or expect estimation risk to be a factor explaining any possible 
deviation between CAPM and observed market rates of returns,’ (p. 87).   6 
More recently, Coles and Loewenstein (1988) argue that many of Bawa and Brown’s conclusions are 
driven by the questionable assumption that the return-generating process is exogenous.  Coles and 
Loewenstein take end-of-period payoffs as exogenous, and allow prices and expected returns to adjust in 
equilibrium.  They show that estimation risk affects fundamental economic features like relative prices, 
expected returns, and betas, although they continue to find that the CAPM holds in equilibrium. 
  Bawa and Brown (1979) and Coles and Loewenstein (1988) both examine the subjective distribution 
of returns.  Its relevance for empirical research is questionable:  although equilibrium imposes pricing 
restrictions under the subjective distribution, empirical tests use returns that are generated from the true 
distribution.  Beliefs are relevant only insofar as they impact observable quantities.  The basic distinction 
between the true and subjective distributions has typically been glossed over in the cross-sectional 
literature.  Because the two distributions differ with estimation risk, we show that observed returns will 
typically deviate from the predictions of the CAPM, even when investors attempt to hold mean-variance 
efficient portfolios.  Moreover, the deviations can be predictable, in either time-series or cross-sectional 
regressions, using past dividends and prices. 
  In short, our primary message is that estimation risk drives a wedge between the distribution 
perceived by investors and the distribution estimated by empirical tests.  Although investors are rational, 
the empirical properties of prices and returns can look very different from the properties under the 
subjective distribution.  Stock returns can appear predictable, in time-series or cross-sectionally, even 
though they are not from the perspective of rational investors.  As a result, parameter uncertainty has 
important implications for characterizing and testing market efficiency.  Our point here is not to argue 
that estimation risk necessarily explains empirically-observed asset-pricing anomalies.  Rather, we 
emphasize that many so-called ‘tests of market efficiency’ cannot distinguish between an efficient market 
with estimation risk and an irrational market.  We believe that a world with estimation risk is the 
appropriate benchmark for evaluating apparent deviations from market efficiency. 
  Our results extend a growing literature on learning and parameter uncertainty.  In the continuous-
time literature, Merton (1971) and Williams (1977) show that parameter uncertainty creates a ‘new’ state   7 
variable representing investors’ current beliefs, and the hedging demand associated with this state variable 
can cause deviations from the CAPM (see also Detemple, 1986; Dothan and Feldman, 1986; Gennotte, 
1986).  Our results are different because investors in our model attempt to hold mean-variance efficient 
portfolios; it is their mistakes, not their hedging demands, that induce deviations from the CAPM.  Stulz 
(1987) and Lewis (1989) also point out that prices can appear to overreact or underreact to information 
simply because investors must learn about the underlying true process.  Wang (1993) and Brennan and 
Xia (1998) show that learning about an unobservable state variable might increase return volatility, but 
the effect on predictability is less clear.  Finally, Timmermann (1993, 1996) recognizes that parameter 
uncertainty might induce both predictability and excess volatility.  We extend his work by analyzing an 
equilibrium model with fully rational (Bayesian) investors, and we discuss the implications for market 
efficiency and the cross-section of expected returns. 
  The paper is organized as follows.  Sections 2 and 3 introduce the basic model and derive capital 
market equilibrium.  Section 4 examines the time-series properties of prices and returns and Section 5 
explores the cross-sectional behavior of returns.  Section 6 generalizes the model to incorporate 
informative priors, time-varying parameters, and non-stationary dividends, and presents simulation 
evidence from the general model.  Section 7 concludes. 
 
2. The model 
  We present a simple overlapping-generations model of capital market equilibrium in which the 
dividend, or cashflow, process is taken as exogenous.  Investors are uncertain about the true dividend 
process and update their beliefs with observed data.  Many features of the model are borrowed from the 
economy analyzed by DeLong, Shleifer, Summers, and Waldmann (DSSW, 1990).  Like DSSW, we 
examine capital market equilibrium when investors’ beliefs diverge from the true distribution.  In their 
model, noise traders’ beliefs are exogenously specified and irrational.  In contrast, investors in our model 
are rational and use all available information when making decisions. 
 
2.1. Time   8 
  We analyze the properties of asset prices in an infinite-period model, t = 1, …, ∞ .  In single-period 
models of estimation risk, the end-of-period distribution of either returns or payoffs is exogenously 
specified (e.g., Bawa, Brown, and Klein, 1979; Coles and Loewenstein, 1988).  In contrast, end-of-period 
prices in our model are determined by investors’ beliefs, and both payoffs and returns are endogenous.  
When making decisions, investors must anticipate how market prices will react to the arrival of new 
information.  Thus, the model permits a detailed investigation of both the time-series and cross-sectional 
behavior of returns. 
 
2.2. Assets 
  We assume that there exists a riskless asset which pays real dividend r in every period.  Following 
DSSW, the riskless asset is assumed to have perfectly elastic supply:  it can be converted into, or created 
from, one unit of the consumption good in any period.  As a result, its price in real terms must equal one 
and the riskless rate of return equals r. 
The capital market also consists of N risky securities.  As mentioned above, estimation risk has 
implications for both the time-series and cross-sectional behavior of asset prices.  When we discuss the 
time-series properties of prices and returns, we examine a model with a single risky asset.  The analysis 
with many risky assets focuses on the cross-sectional implications of estimation risk. 
  Following Coles and Loewenstein (1988), we model investor uncertainty about an exogenously-
specified cashflow process.  Clearly, nothing can be learned about the return process if it is simply taken 
as exogenous, as assumed by Williams (1977) and Bawa and Brown (1979).  If returns are endogenous, it 
is unclear how investors in the model would update their beliefs directly about the distribution of returns.  
For example, we doubt that any multiperiod model with estimation risk would produce returns that are 
independently and identically distributed (IID) over time.  We show later that price reversals are inherent 
in a model with estimation risk, so it is unlikely that returns would be serially uncorrelated.  Since the 
dividend process is assumed to be exogenous, we do not have to worry about how investors’ beliefs affect 
its distribution. 
  The risky assets each have one unit outstanding and pay real dividend dt, an N× 1 vector, in period t.    9 
To develop the ideas in a simple framework, we initially assume that dividends are IID over time and 
have a multivariate normal distribution (MVN): 
[] Σ δ   ,   MVN   ~ dt ,                        ( 1 )  
where δ  is the mean vector and Σ  is a nonsingular covariance matrix.  Notice that the parameters of this 
distribution are assumed to be constant over time.  As a consequence, estimation risk will vanish as t goes 
to infinity.  In reality, parameter uncertainty seems unlikely to disappear even after a long history of data.  
The economy evolves over time, and the underlying cashflow process undoubtedly changes as well.  
Therefore, we extend the model in Section 6 to include unobservable shocks to the true parameters which 
periodically renew estimation risk. 
The IID assumption is not intended to be realistic, but dramatically simplifies the exposition.  Again, 
we relax this assumption later and allow dividends to follow a geometric random walk.  In addition, we 
have explored a model in which dividends are autocorrelated over time, and the qualitative results appear 
to be similar.  Throughout the paper, investors are assumed to know the form of the distribution function 
(IID and normal), but may not know its parameters. 
 
2.3. Investors 
  Individuals live for two periods, with overlapping generations.  Following DSSW, there is no first-
period consumption, no labor supply decision, and no bequest.  Therefore, in the first period individuals 
decide only how to invest their exogenously-given wealth.  We assume that investors can be represented 
by a single agent with constant absolute risk aversion, or 
U(w)  exp ( 2   w) =− − γ ,                       ( 2 )  
where w is second-period wealth and γ  > 0 is the risk-aversion parameter. 
  Investors in this model do not have to allocate wealth across time.  We ignore the intertemporal 
nature of the consumption problem and focus instead on estimation risk.  It is almost immediate that 
investors will attempt to hold mean-variance efficient portfolios, and will not have hedging demands 
related to changes in investment opportunities (see Merton, 1973).  This assumption limits the ways in   10 
which estimation risk can affect equilibrium, and distinguishes the predictability in our model from that in 
Merton (1971) and Williams (1977).  In those papers, learning creates a state variable representing 
investors’ beliefs, and the demand for risky assets contains a hedging component associated with this state 
variable.  Our paper emphasizes a distinct phenomenon.  We show that the difference between the true 
and subjective distributions can be a source of predictable returns. 
  The representative investor chooses a portfolio to maximize expected utility, where the expectation 
is taken over the investor’s subjective belief about the distribution of next-period wealth.  In all the cases 
we consider, both dividends and wealth are normally distributed.  Consequently, it is easily shown that 
maximizing expected utility is equivalent to maximizing  w µ −  γ
2
w σ , where  w µ  and 
2
w σ  are the mean and 
variance of wealth.  Let pt be the vector of risky-asset prices and xt be the vector of shares held in the 
portfolio.  The investor will choose 













,               ( 3 )  
where 
s
t E  and 
s
t var denote the subjective expectation and variance at t.
3  The first term in brackets is the 
covariance matrix of gross returns, and the second term is the expected excess gross return.  Note that the 
optimal investment in the risky assets is not a function of initial wealth, an implication of constant 
absolute risk aversion.  Also, given our assumptions that investors are short-lived and returns are 
multivariate normal, it is immediate that investors attempt to hold mean-variance efficient portfolios.  
Consequently, 
*
t x  is the Markowitz tangency portfolio under the subjective distribution. 
Equilibrium in the economy, which treats current and future prices as endogenous, must satisfy eq. 
(3).  In addition, equilibrium requires that the demands for the risky assets, given by 
*
t x , equal their 
supply in every period.  Setting 
*
t x =  ι , where ι  is an N× 1 vector of ones, and solving for price yields 
[] ι γ −   ) d   + (p  var   2     ) d   + (p E   
r + 1
1
= p 1 + t 1 + t
s
t 1 + t 1 + t
s
t t .                      ( 4 )  
                                                   
3 Throughout the paper we denote subjective moments with an ‘s’ superscript.   11 
This equation gives the equilibrium current price in terms of next-period’s price, which in turn will be 
endogenously determined. 
 
3. Capital market equilibrium 
  This section derives capital market equilibrium with and without estimation risk.  We assume 
throughout that investors correctly anticipate how prices will react to the arrival of new information.  In 
other words, equilibrium satisfies the rational expectations property that the pricing function perceived by 
investors equals the true pricing function (Lucas, 1978).  This condition does not imply, however, that 
investors’ subjective belief about the distribution of returns equals the true distribution.  Rational 
expectations, as we use the term, implies that these distributions are equal only if investors have perfect 
knowledge of the dividend process. 
 
3.1. Equilibrium with perfect information 
  Suppose, initially, that investors know the dividend process.  This equilibrium will serve as a 
convenient benchmark for the model with estimation risk.  Since dividends are IID and the optimal 
investment in the risky asset does not depend on initial wealth, a natural equilibrium to look for is one in 
which prices are constant, or pt = p.  With constant prices, Et(pt+1 + dt+1) = p + δ  and vart(pt+1 + dt+1) = Σ .  
Substituting into eq. (4) and solving for price yields 
ι Σ
γ
− δ    
r
2
   
r
1
  =   p .                        ( 5 )  
The price of a risky asset equals its expected dividends discounted at the riskless rate minus a ‘correction’ 
for risk.  Not surprisingly, an asset’s contribution to the risk of the market portfolio (proportional to Σι ; 
see below) is important, rather than its total variance.  Investors require an expected rate of return that is 
higher than the riskless rate if the asset’s ‘market risk’ is positive. 
  Many of the time-series implications of estimation risk can be investigated in a model with a single 
risky asset.  The properties of this asset are identical to those of the market portfolio when there are many 
risky assets.  In particular, the market portfolio M has weights proportional to the vector of prices, pt = p.    12 
Its value, or price, equals 








− δ ,                      ( 6 )  
where the dividend on the market portfolio has expectation δ M = ι′δ  and variance 
2
M σ = ι′Σι .  Since the 
variance is always positive, the expected return on the market portfolio is necessarily greater than the 
riskless rate.  Referring back to the pricing function with many assets, it is straightforward to show that 
the general model collapses to eq. (6) when N = 1. 
 
3.2. Equilibrium with estimation risk 
  The model above assumes that investors have perfect knowledge about the dividend process – that is, 
they know both the mean and the variance with certainty.  We now relax this strong assumption.   
Specifically, suppose that investors begin with a diffuse prior over δ  (the prior density function is 
proportional to a constant).  Although this prior permits δ  to be negative, it is the standard representation 
of ‘knowing little’ about the mean and simplifies the algebra.  We later consider alternative prior beliefs.  
With an informative prior, investors assign less weight to the data and more weight to their initial beliefs, 
which can be important for the way prices behave in equilibrium.  Consequently, the results in this and 
the next section should be interpreted as illustrative, but not completely representative, of the effects of 
estimation risk.  For simplicity, we continue to assume that investors know the covariance matrix of 
dividends.  Previous research finds that uncertainty about the covariance matrix is relatively unimportant 
(e.g., Coles, Loewenstein, and Suay, 1995), and we doubt that it would affect our basic conclusions. 
  Investors update their beliefs using Bayes rule, incorporating the information in observed dividends.  
With a diffuse prior, the posterior distribution of δ  at time t is  ]   ) t 1 (   , d [   MVN t Σ , where  t d  is the vector 
of average dividends observed up to time t.  The subjective, or in Bayesian terms ‘predictive,’ distribution 




 Σ  
t
1 + t
  , d   MVN   ~   d t
s
1 + t .                      ( 7 )  
An investor’s best guess about the mean of the dividend process is simply the average realized dividend.    13 
The covariance matrix of the predictive distribution reflects both the true variance, Σ , and uncertainty 
about the mean, Σ  / t. 
  From eq. (7), it is clear that the subjective distribution of dividends, and consequently of future 
prices, differs from the true distribution.  Rational expectations requires, however, that investors correctly 
anticipate how equilibrium prices will be determined next period.  We impose this requirement by 
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s
1 - k t
s
t k t .                 ( 8 )  
Price is a function of expected dividends and the expected conditional variance of gross returns.  Since 
estimation risk ‘scales up’ the predictive variance by (t+1)/t, the conditional variance of returns is 
unlikely to be constant.  However, if price is a linear function of  t d , then the conditional variance of 
returns will be a deterministic function of time.  We look for an equilibrium that has this property. 
  If the conditional variance of returns is deterministic, then we can drop the expectations operator 
from the infinite sum in eq. (8).  Variation in prices is driven entirely by the first term.  Therefore, the 
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2
1 + t 1 + t
s
t .                   ( 9 )  
Substituting into eq. (8) yields the equilibrium pricing function: 
ι Σ γ −     f(t)     2     d
r
1






























  .               ( 1 1 )  
The equilibrium price is similar to the price with perfect information (eq. 5).  The mean of the predictive 
distribution,  t d , replaces the true mean in the first term and the function f(t) replaces 1/r in the second 
                                                   
4 Eq. (8) imposes the transversality condition limk→∞ Et[pt+k]/(1+r)
k = 0, which will be satisfied in equilibrium.   14 
term.  The function f(t) decreases as t gets larger and converges to 1/r in the limit.  Since the probability 
limit of  t d i s  δ , the equilibrium price with estimation risk converges to the price with perfect information.  
This is intuitive because, as mentioned above, estimation risk vanishes in the limit.  In Section 6 we allow 
the true parameters to change, so that investors never completely learn the dividend process. 
  We noted in Section 2 that investors attempt to hold the tangency portfolio, which implies that the 
CAPM must describe expected returns under the subjective distribution.  We will discuss the CAPM in 
more detail below, but for now we note that the market portfolio’s value, or price, is 
pM,t = ι′  pt = 
2
M t M,   f(t)     2 d
r
1
σ γ − ,                   ( 1 2 )  
where  t t M, d   d ι ′ =  is the average dividend on the market portfolio from t = 1 to t.  Referring back to the 
pricing function with many assets, it is straightforward to show that the general model collapses to eq. 
(12) when N = 1. 
  Several colleagues have noted that the pricing function in eq. (10) could also be generated by a 
model with a nonstationary dividend process and no estimation risk.  In particular, suppose investors have 
perfect information and the true mean of the dividend process evolves over time as a function of average 
realized dividends (that is, δ t+1 =  t d ).  In this case, the pricing function would be identical to the price in 
our model.  Notice, however, that our model should be distinguishable from one with nonstationary 
dividends.  Prices and expected returns evolve quite differently in the two models.  With a changing 
dividend process and perfect information, expected gross returns would be positively related to lagged 
dividends, and prices would exhibit no tendency to revert to a long-run mean.  The opposite is true in our 
model; true expected returns are negatively related to lagged dividends and price fluctuations are 
temporary.  Further, nonstationary dividends would not generate deviations from the CAPM. 
 
4. The time-series properties of prices and returns 
  Equilibrium, derived above, is determined by the subjective distribution of returns.  However, 
empirical tests use prices and returns drawn from the true distribution.  As we emphasized before, the   15 
subjective and true distributions differ when there is estimation risk, even though investors know the true 
pricing function.  In this section, we examine the time-series properties of prices and returns, highlighting 
the impact of estimation risk on market efficiency.  The analysis considers a model with a single risky 
asset, interpreted as the market portfolio.  In this case, the price of the risky asset is given by eqs. (6) and 
(12).  We drop the subscript ‘M’ throughout this section for convenience. 
In the model with perfect information, prices are constant and returns simply equal realized 
dividends.  With estimation risk, prices fluctuate as investors update their beliefs about the dividend 
process.  From the previous section, the change in price from t to t+1 equals 
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The change in price contains two components.  The first term is random and reflects changes in investors’ 
beliefs about expected dividends.  The second term is deterministic and arises because estimation risk 
declines steadily over time.  Since f(t+1) < f(t), this component tends to make prices increase over time.  
When we talk about predictability, the deterministic portion serves only to add an additional, non-random 
component to the equations.  Therefore, to focus on the main ideas, we assume in this section that 
investors are risk-neutral (γ  = 0), causing the second term in the equation to drop out.  None of the results 
are sensitive to this assumption. 
 
4.1. Predictability 
  Previous studies argue that returns might be predictable either because business conditions change 
over time or because investors are irrational.  However, these stories cannot explain why returns would be 
predictable in our model.  The riskless rate, preferences, and the distribution of cash flows do not change, 
so ‘business conditions’ are constant by construction.  In addition, investors are rational and use all 
available information when making decisions, so irrational mispricing does not exist.  In our model, 
estimation risk is the only source of predictability. 
  As noted above, returns equal dividends when investors have perfect information.  With estimation 
risk, returns at t+1 equal   16 
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The first term equals realized dividends, and the second term equals the change in price.  At time t, 
investors’ best guess about dividends is given by  t d ; when realized dividends differ from this 
expectation, investors revise their beliefs about the mean of the dividend process, which in turn affects 
prices. 
Under the subjective distribution, it is clear that prices follow a martingale: 
0     ] p p [ E t 1 t
s
t = − + .                      ( 1 5 )  
However, the empirical properties of returns will differ from the perceived properties.  The reason is 
simple.  From the investor’s perspective, the expected dividend is random, represented by a posterior 
belief over δ .  In contrast, for an empirical test, the dividend mean is fixed and constant, equal to 
whatever the true value actually is; the process that generates observed dividends does not have a random 
mean.  Put differently, the observable properties of returns are conditional on the true dividend process 
even though it is unknown.  Because of this fundamental difference between the true and subjective 
distributions, changes in prices can appear predictable to a researcher.  From eq. (14), the true conditional 
expected return is 
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It is clear that Rt+1 is negatively related to past dividends.
5  Although dividends are IID by assumption, 
price revisions are negatively correlated with past cash flows.  The intuituion is fairly straightforward.  
Prices depend on investors’ best guess about future dividends, given by  t d .  The higher that past 
dividends have been, the lower that changes in beliefs are expected to be.  As a result, price revisions 
move opposite to past cash flows. 
  From eq. (15), prices, dividends, and returns all predict time-variation in expected returns.  For 
                                                   
5 For simplicity, we examine the predictability of gross returns rather than rates of return.  The analysis with rates 
of return is more difficult because it involves expectations of ratios, but the qualitative results are similar.   17 
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With estimation risk, returns are negatively autocorrelated.  A researcher who ignores estimation risk, and 
observes that business conditions do not change, would come to the incorrect conclusion that investors 
overreact:  higher returns today predict lower future returns.  Similarly, 
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A high dividend today predicts lower future returns, which would suggest that investors naively 
extrapolate recent dividend performance into the future.  However, investors are completely rational in 
our model and the predictability is driven entirely by estimation risk.  Investors appropriately incorporate 
all relevant information, but today’s dividend causes a revision in prices that moves opposite to expected 
returns. 
  We later present simulation evidence to show how estimation risk can affect empirical tests.  To 
illustrate the results, Fig. 1 depicts a sample price path for the risky asset.  The figure assumes that 
investors are risk-neutral and the riskless rate is 0.05.  Dividends have mean 0.05 and standard deviation 
0.10, taken to be similar to the dividend yield and volatility of dividends on the market portfolio.  Under 
these assumptions, the price of the risky asset without estimation risk equals one and its expected rate of 
return is 0.05.  The price with estimation risk depends on realized average dividends, which we randomly 
draw from a normal distribution.  The figure shows that the price of the risky asset tends to revert towards 
‘fundamental’ value.  The sample autocorrelation in returns equals -0.10 for the periods shown (t = 10 to 
110) and the correlation between rates of return and lagged prices equals -0.28.  True conditional 
expected rates of return vary from 2.0% to 6.2%.
7 
  In this example, the mean-reversion in asset prices is obvious from the figure.  The price-reversal 
                                                   
6 This covariance is time-dependent because estimation risk declines over time.  We will break the strong 
connection between time and predictability in Section 6 when we allow the true dividend process to change. 
7 The example is for illustration purposes only.  The reported statistics do not adjust for small-sample bias in the 
correlation and regression coefficients.  We present more extensive simulation evidence in Section 6.   18 
effect of estimation risk might be observable to a researcher, yet prices at every point in time are set 
rationally.  Investors ignore the negative relation between returns and dividends because it provides no 
useful information about future expected returns.  Similar results for actual stock market data would be 
interpreted as evidence against efficient markets.  However, ex ante, investors in this example could not 
have forecast any variation in expected returns. 
  The analysis above considers the predictability of one-period returns.  Investor expectations are 
highly persistent, however, and price reversals can take many periods to occur.  As a result, the negative 
relation between returns and past dividends becomes stronger for long-horizon returns.  Define the H-
period return ending at t+H as the sum of one-period returns, or R tH
H
+  = Rt+1 + … + Rt+H.  Then the 
conditional expected H-period return is 
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Similar to one-period returns, 
H
H t R +  is negatively related to past prices.  Except for the substitution of t+H 
for t+1 in the denominator, the expected return is H-times more sensitive to changes in average dividends 
than one-period returns.  As a result, the price-reversal effect of estimation risk will be more pronounced 
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which increases by a factor of H
2 as the horizon is lengthened (except for the change from t+1 to t+H in 
the denominator).  The variance of returns increases at a rate less than H, so returns become more 
negatively autocorrelated as the return horizon lengthens.  Results are similar for the relation between 
expected returns and lagged dividends. 
In short, estimation risk can be a source of predictability.  However, the predictability of total returns 
does not say anything directly about market efficiency.  In the model analyzed by Lucas (1978), for 
example, returns are predictable yet the market is efficient.  To get a clearer picture of market efficiency, 
we need to examine the predictability of return surprises.  A standard result in finance is that forecast   19 
errors should be unpredictable if investors are rational.  Indeed, tests of market efficiency, like those 
analyzed by Shiller (1981) and Abel and Mishkin (1983), rely on the assumption that rational forecast 
errors are uncorrelated with past information.  In the presence of estimation risk, we show that rationality 
no longer imposes this restriction.  Investors form expectations based on past information, so forecast 
errors will be correlated under the true distribution with past cash flows. 
  The unexpected portion of returns, URt+1, is given by the difference between realized returns and 
investors’ subjective expectation, or Rt+1 −   [] 1 + t
s
t R E .  In this section, we have assumed that investors are 
risk-neutral, implying that unexpected returns equal excess returns.  From eq. (14), 
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It follows that 
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Therefore, like total returns, the unexpected portion of returns is predictable based on past dividends, 
returns, and prices.  It is precisely this result that differentiates predictability in our model from 
predictability in other models with rational investors.  With perfect information, excess returns must be 
unpredictable if investors are risk-neutral.  In contrast, once we allow for parameter uncertainty, excess 
returns can be predictable even with rational, risk-neutral investors. 
Thus, not only do subjective expectations differ from true expectations, but they do so in a way that 
is predictable with prices and dividends.  With incomplete information, investors form expectations based 
on observed dividends.  If these have been, say, abnormally high, then price will be inflated above its 
fundamental (perfect information) value.  Consequently, prices are related to future returns in a way that 
resembles overreaction.  The predictability is consistent with rational expectations because it is based on 
the unknown, true distribution.  We emphasize, however, that the true distribution determines the 
empirical properties of returns even though it is unknown.  At the time portfolio decisions are made, 
investors cannot know whether past dividends have been above or below the true mean.  Over time,   20 
investors learn more about expected cash flows and, looking back, can observe the negative relation 
between prices and unexpected returns (as illustrated by Fig. 1). 
  Throughout this section, we have found that parameter uncertainty creates price reversals and 
negative autocorrelation in returns.  These results are relevant for the large empirical literature on excess 
volatility and apparent overreaction.  However, several studies also document momentum in stock returns.  
Jegadeesh and Titman (1993), for example, find that short-term ‘winners’ (stocks that performed well 
over the past 3 to 12 months) have higher future returns than short-term ‘losers.’  In Section 6, we show 
that informative priors might give rise to momentum in returns.  In addition, alternative cashflow 
processes, such as autocorrelated dividends, could generate momentum if investors are uncertain about 
the persistence of cash flows. 
 
4.2. Price volatility 
  Price volatility is closely related to predictability (see, e.g., Campbell, 1991).  For example, investor 
overreaction generally implies that returns will be both negatively autocorrelated and excessively volatile.  
Given our results above, it is clear that estimation risk will significantly affect the variance of prices and 
returns. 
  In the model without estimation risk, the variance of returns simply equals the variance of dividends, 
σ
2.  With parameter uncertainty, prices fluctuate over time as investors update their beliefs about the 
dividend process.  In particular, the (true) conditional variance of price is 
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and the unconditional variance is 
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Estimation risk increases both the conditional and unconditional variances of observed prices.  Similar to 
inferences about return predictability, ignoring the effects of estimation risk would suggest investor 
overreaction.  However, ‘excess’ volatility simply reflects parameter uncertainty; volatility is high   21 
precisely because investors rationally update their beliefs. 
  In the model, a relatively small amount of parameter uncertainty will substantially increase price 
volatility.  Suppose, for example, that investors are risk-neutral, the riskless rate is 0.05, and dividends are 
distributed with mean 0.05 and standard deviation 0.10.  (These are the values used in Fig. 1.)  In this 
case, the value of the risky asset equals one when the dividend process is known.  With parameter 
uncertainty, the standard deviation of pt equals  t 2 , which remains significant as a percentage of 
fundamental value for rather large t.  When t is, say, 100 the standard deviation of price is 0.20.  This 
implies that the length of a two-standard-deviation confidence interval is 80% of fundamental value, 
despite the fact that the subjective standard deviation of dividends is less than one percent greater than the 
true standard deviation. 
  Thus, the model suggests that prices might vary considerably around their ‘true’ values.  The 
deviations are eventually reversed, giving rise to predictable variation in returns, yet investors are 
completely rational.  Put differently, stock price movements do not have to be explained by subsequent 
changes in dividends.  Indeed, in our model, prices are completely uncorrelated with future dividends.  
Prices are backward looking and, ignoring estimation risk, investors appear to overreact to past 
information. 
  Asset prices can also violate the volatility bounds that have been the focus of much empirical 
research.  For example, Shiller (1981) argues that an immediate consequence of ‘optimal forecasts’ is that 
var(pt) ≤  var(
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where 
*
t p  is the ex post rational price, or the price based on realized, rather than expected, dividends.  
That is, 
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With perfect information and rational investors, the bound holds because 
*
t p  equals the actual price plus a 
random, unpredictable forecast error.  We saw above, however, that the forecast error with parameter   22 
uncertainty can be negatively related to price.  In the current model, the variance of 
*
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Comparing this to eq. (23), we see that the volatility bound will be violated for t ≤  1 + 2/r.  Perhaps more 
directly, however, prices violate the basic premise of the volatility-bound literature, that revisions in 
prices should only reflect changes in true expected dividends.  With estimation risk, new information 
about future dividends does not have to correspond to changes in the true distribution.  Thus, the volatility 
literature tests the joint hypothesis that investors are rational and have perfect information about the 
dividend process.  Assuming that investors have less than perfect knowledge, it might be more surprising 
if prices did not violate the bounds. 
  The volatility of returns provides additional insights into the effects of estimation risk.  The 
conditional variance of returns is 
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Comparing this to the variance of the subjective distribution (eq. 9), we find the standard result that the 
subjective variance equals the true variance multiplied by (t+1)/t.  Also, compared to the variance of 
returns when δ  is known, which is just σ
2, we see that estimation risk greatly increases return volatility if t 
is small.  For example, if the riskfree rate is 0.05 and t is 50, the conditional variance of returns is roughly 
twice as big with estimation risk than without. 
 
5. The cross-section of expected returns 
  We now return to the model with many assets and analyze the cross-sectional behavior of returns.  In 
single-period models, Bawa and Brown (1979) and Coles and Loewenstein (1988) find that the CAPM 
continues to hold with estimation risk.  These studies focus exclusively on the subjective distribution of 
returns, and find that estimation risk is largely irrelevant for equilibrium.  We emphasize instead the 
observable behavior of prices and returns.   23 
  Before continuing, we should mention again that investors are assumed to begin with a diffuse prior.  
This assumption will affect the results in a variety of ways.  For example, an informative prior can contain 
more information about some securities than others.  The diffuse prior, on the other hand, is ‘symmetric.’
8  
To see why this is important, recall that unexpected returns in the model equal 
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where URt+1, dt+1, and  t d  are now N× 1 vectors.  In the brackets, the term ‘1/r(t+1)’ gives the effect that 
unexpected dividends have on prices.  With a diffuse prior, price revisions are proportional to the vector 
of unexpected dividends.  This result will not generally hold with an informative prior.  Dividends on 
assets with relatively high amounts of prior information provide clues about the values of other securities 
(Clarkson, Guedes, and Thompson, 1996; Stambaugh, 1997).  We discuss informative priors further in 
Section 6. 
 
5.1. Covariances and betas 
  When we talk about the CAPM, it will be useful to have a few results on covariances and market 
betas.  With one risky asset, we saw that parameter uncertainty increases both the subjective and true 
volatility of returns.  Similarly, with many assets, estimation risk scales up the true covariance matrix.  In 










1 + t t 1) (t r 
1
1 R v a r .                  ( 2 9 )  
The effect of estimation risk is analogous to the single asset case:  uncertainty about δ  increases the true 
volatility of prices and returns.  In the model with perfect information, prices are constant and the 
covariance matrix of returns simply equals Σ .  With estimation risk, investor uncertainty increases all 
variances and covariances proportionally.  Further, this statement describes both the subjective and true 
                                                   
8 With a symmetric prior, the prior covariance matrix is proportional to the true covariance matrix.  That is, the 
prior distribution over δ  has the form MVN [δ *, Σ /h], where h is a measure of prior information.  The diffuse prior 
can be interpreted as the limiting distribution as h approaches zero.   24 
covariance matrices.  Comparing eqs. (9) and (29), we find that the subjective covariance matrix equals 
the true covariance matrix multiplied by (t+1)/t, and both are proportional to Σ .
9 
Because estimation risk simply scales up the covariance matrix, it does not affect market betas (for 
gross returns).  The market return is the sum of the asset returns, and market volatility increases by the 
same factor as the covariance matrix.  Consequently, with and without parameter uncertainty, betas equal 
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Note also that eq. (30) gives both subjective and true market betas, which are the same because the two 
covariance matrices are proportional.  Again, this result is an artifact of the diffuse prior.  With an 




5.2. Expected returns and the CAPM 
  In Section 4, we found that total and unexpected returns are predictable with lagged dividends and 
prices.  With many assets, we consider instead deviations from the CAPM.  We examine both the time-
series and cross-sectional predictability of these deviations. 
  With and without estimation risk, the subjective distribution of returns is multivariate normal.   
Together with the assumption that investors derive utility only from end-of-period wealth, this implies 
that the CAPM must hold under the subjective distribution.  In terms of gross returns, the CAPM says 
that 
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Eq. (31) can be verified by substituting for equilibrium price and subjective expected returns, derived 
above.  Investors attempt to hold mean-variance efficient portfolios, which imposes the CAPM restriction 
                                                   
9 The assumption that investors begin with a diffuse prior is important here.  With informative priors, the 
subjective and true covariance matrices may not be proportional, and neither has to be proportional to Σ .  See 
Section 6. 
10 The analysis here focuses on gross returns, not rates of return.  As noted by Coles and Loewenstein (1988), 
estimation risk does affect rate-of-return betas.  Asset i’s rate-of-return beta equals its gross-return beta multiplied   25 
on subjective expected returns.  However, empirical tests use returns taken from the true, not the 
subjective, distribution. 
To analyze the cross-sectional properties of returns, we focus on ex post deviations from the CAPM, 
given by 
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Note that at+1 is similar to the vector of unexpected returns, except that the realized return on the market 
enters eq. (32) rather than the expected market return.  We know from Section 4 that the market return is 
predictable based on past information.  By examining at+1, rather than unexpected returns, we eliminate 
predictability that is related to the aggregate market. 
  Deviations from the CAPM must be unpredictable under the subjective distribution: 
[] 0 a E 1 t
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In the absence of estimation risk, market efficiency implies that the true conditional expectation of at+1 is 
zero.  This restriction, of course, forms the basis for empirical tests of the CAPM.  For example, cross-
sectional regressions, like those in Fama and MacBeth (1973), indirectly test whether firm characteristics 
predict cross-sectional variation in ai,t+1.  The multivariate F-statistic of Gibbons, Ross, and Shanken 
(1989) tests whether the unconditional expectation of at+1 is zero, which follows from the law of iterated 
expectations.  Finally, various conditional asset-pricing tests directly examine the conditional expectation 
of at+1 (e.g., Harvey, 1989; Shanken, 1990). 
  With parameter uncertainty, rational expectations no longer requires that the true expectation of at+1 
equals zero.  Substituting for prices and returns in eq. (32) and taking expectations yields 
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In general, this will deviate from zero.  Similar to unexpected returns in the model with a single risky 
security, deviations from the CAPM are negatively related to past dividends and prices.  In particular, for 
                                                                                                                                                                    
by pm,t / pi,t.  Rate-of-return betas will change unless relative prices remain the same, which will not be true in 
general.   26 
any asset i: 
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where var(ε i) is the residual variance when the asset’s dividend is regressed on the market dividend.  The 
ability of price to predict time-variation in ai,t+1 is similar to its ability to predict unexpected returns, 
except that var(ε i) is substituted for the dividend’s total variance.  Again, we see that estimation risk 
induces price reversals and apparent overreaction by investors.  When investors’ best guess about 
expected dividends for a given stock is above the true mean (after adjusting for marketwide mispricing), 
price is inflated above its fundamental value and expected returns are lower than predicted by the CAPM. 
  Eq. (35) is essentially a time-series relation.  The predictability of at+1 arises because investors do not 
know whether past dividends are greater than or less than the true mean.  At any point in time, however, 
investors observe whether each security’s average dividend is above or below the cross-sectional average.  
Our initial guess, then, was that deviations from the CAPM would not be cross-sectionally related to 
lagged prices:  if cross-sectional variation in ai,t+1 was related to the observable quantity pi,t, it would seem 
that investors could use this information to earn abnormal returns.  Surprisingly (to us), this intuition is 
wrong.  In sample, the cross-sectional relation between ai,t+1 and pi,t is 
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Taking the unconditional expectation yields 
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which is negative because every covariance term is negative (see eq. 35).  In the presence of estimation 
risk, lagged dividends and prices explain cross-sectional variation in expected returns after controlling for 
betas.  Investors understand the negative cross-sectional relation, but they cannot use this information to 
be better off.   27 
  We find this result paradoxical.  To gain some intuition, consider the decision process of a rational 
investor.  Implicitly, the expectation in eq. (37) integrates over all possible price paths from time 1 to t+1.  
However, at time t, the conditional cross-sectional relation can be either positive or negative, depending 
on the difference between  t d and δ .  In other words, conditional on observing  t d , the cross-sectional 
covariance between prices and at+1 depends on the true value of δ .  Investors understand this dependence, 
and their beliefs about δ  determine their investment choices.  Thus, they integrate over the subjective 
distribution of δ  to make portfolio decisions.  The resulting belief about at+1 will always have mean zero.  
The point is simply that investors do not ignore the relation between prices and deviations from the 
CAPM, but their best forecast of at+1 at any point in time is always zero. 
  Alternatively, we can think about this in terms of an individual asset.  Suppose that an asset has a 
relatively high price compared with other stocks.  Does this imply that the asset is overvalued relative to 
its ‘fundamental’ value?  The answer depends, of course, on the actual value of δ i, which is unknown.  
Integrating over the posterior beliefs about δ i, an investors’ best guess at all times is that the asset is fairly 
priced.  Yet in hypothetical repeated sampling, the asset with the highest price will, on average, be 
overvalued.  This puzzle highlights the distinction between the conditional nature of Bayesian decision 
making (conditional on the observed prices) and the frequentist perspective of classical statistics.  For a 
Bayesian investor, hypothetical repeated sampling is irrelevant to the portfolio decision, which must be 
made after observing only a single realization of prices (see Berger, 1985, for an extensive discussion of 
these issues). 
  To illustrate the cross-sectional results, we simulate a set of prices and returns in the model.  Similar 
to the example in Section 4, we assume that investors are risk-neutral and the riskless rate is 0.05.  In 
addition, all risky assets, with N = 15, have true expected dividends equal to 0.05.  Hence, all prices equal 
one in the absence of estimation risk.  When δ  is unknown, security prices depend on realized dividends, 
which we randomly generate from a MVN distribution.  To provide a reasonable covariance matrix, we 
estimate the return covariance matrix for 15 industry portfolios formed from all stocks on the Center for 
Research in Security Prices (CRSP) database.   28 
  Both the time-series and cross-sectional behavior of returns reveal the price-reversal effect of 
estimation risk.  For t = 10 through 110, the correlation between total return and lagged price is negative 
for every security, with a mean correlation of -0.21.  Deviations from the CAPM also appear predictable 
based on lagged prices:  the average correlation between ai,t+1 and pi,t is -0.16, and 14 out of the 15 
correlations are negative.  Cross-sectionally, the relation between ai,t+1 and pi,t is significantly negative in 
Fama-MacBeth style regressions, with a t-statistic of -3.97.  On average, an increase in price from one 
standard deviation below to one standard deviation above the cross-sectional mean leads to a -0.042 
change in ai,t+1.  Since prices are generally close to one, this would imply that Jensen’s alpha, based on 
rates of return, decreases by approximately -4.2%.  Although investors attempt to hold mean-variance 
efficient portfolios and use all available information when making decisions, expected returns can differ 
substantially from the predictions of the CAPM.  Additional simulations show that this example is typical.  
For example, across 2500 simulations, Fama-MacBeth regressions produce an average t-statistic of –3.75 
with a standard deviation of 0.94. 
 
6. Informative priors, time-varying parameters, and simulation evidence 
  We have presented an extremely simple model of estimation risk.  Among the simplifications, we 
assumed that investors begin with no information about expected dividends, all parameters are constant, 
and dividends are IID.  Each of these assumptions makes it difficult to judge the potential empirical 
significance of estimation risk.  In this section, we relax the assumptions to make the model a bit more 
realistic.  We also present simulation evidence to suggest the practical importance of the results. 
 
6.1. Informative priors 
  The assumption of diffuse priors has at least two important effects on the model.  First, investors’ 
beliefs about expected dividends are determined entirely by past realized dividends.  With an informative 
prior, investors would put less weight on the data and more weight on their initial beliefs.  Second, an 
investor’s belief about the expected dividend on one asset is determined solely by the realized dividends   29 
on that asset, and does not depend at all on the realized payoffs of other securities.  With an informative 
prior, however, dividends on assets with relatively high amounts of prior information can be useful in 
valuing other assets.  We discuss both of these issues in this subsection.  For now, we continue to assume 
that the true parameters of the dividend process remain constant over time. 
  Consider first the model with one risky asset.  Assume that the variance of the dividend process, σ
2, 
remains known, and suppose that investors begin with some information about the mean.  In particular, 
assume that prior beliefs are centered around some δ
* and have variance σ
2/h, where h is a measure of 
prior information.  Writing the variance in this form is simply for notational convenience; a variance 
equal to σ
2/h means that the investor has prior information that is as informative as a sample of h realized 
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Investors shrink their best guess about expected dividends toward their prior mean, and the variance 
reflects both the volatility of dividends, σ
2, and uncertainty about the mean, σ
2/(t+h).  It is clear that the 
prior mean exerts a permanent, yet diminishing, influence on beliefs.  To the extent that the prior mean 
deviates from δ , investors’ beliefs are ‘biased’ away from the true mean.  However, as before, beliefs 
eventually converge to the true distribution as t gets large. 
  Equilibrium takes nearly the same form as the original model, except that price now reflects prior 
beliefs as well as the information in realized dividends.  Denote the mean of the subjective distribution as 
mt.  At time t, the price of the risky asset equals 
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where f(t) is defined in eq. (11).  With informative priors, the price contains a new term corresponding to 
the initial belief about expected dividends.  It is clear from eq. (39) that the time-series properties of 
prices and returns will be determined by the properties of mt.  Moreover, the prior information anchors the   30 
price to the investor’s initial guess, but does not have a stochastic effect on prices.  As a result, in this 
simple model with fixed parameters, informative priors have little effect on the qualitative conclusions 
from the original model.  Returns continue to be negatively related to past prices and dividends, although 
the magnitude is diminished compared with diffuse priors.  For example, 
[]
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t
R   , p cov σ
+ + +
− = ,                 ( 4 0 )  
which is negative but smaller than the corresponding expression with diffuse priors.  This result is 
actually quite intuitive since prior information has, for practical purposes, the effect of simply adding h 
periods to the model before time 0. 
  We present more thorough simulations in section 6.3, but it may be useful to report simulations here 
to illustrate the impact of informative priors.  The model is simulated 2500 times assuming that investors 
are risk neutral, the riskless rate is 0.05, true expected dividends are 0.10, and the standard deviation of 
dividends is 0.10.  Using the simulated data, we estimate the correlation between excess rates of return, 
which equal unexpected returns because of risk neutrality, and lagged average dividends for 70 periods, 
from t = 10 through t = 80.  The results confirm our analytic work.  The average correlation equals –0.136 
with perfect information (this is negative because of small-sample bias; see Stambaugh, 1999) and at the 
other extreme, the average correlation equals –0.259 with diffuse priors.  Informative priors produce 
results that are between these polar cases.  For example, with h = 20, meaning that investors have 
observed the equivalent of 30 periods of dividends when we begin estimating predictability, the average 
correlation between excess returns and lagged dividends equals –0.198.  These results are not sensitive to 
the prior mean. 
  We should add an important caveat at this point.  The relatively minor effect of informative priors 
depends on the assumption that the true mean is fixed.  Once we allow for shocks to the true parameters, 
informative priors can play a larger role because investors may appear to react slowly to changes in the 
dividend process (see the next section).  In addition, notice that even in the current model, forecast errors 
are all expected to have the same sign because of the permanent influence of the prior mean.  Although   31 
the influence is non-stochastic and does not affect serial correlation in returns, it could create the 
appearance of underreaction in some contexts.  For example, Lewis (1989) argues that a similar 
phenomenon might account for the persistent forecast errors observed in the foreign exchange market in 
the 1980s. 
  Informative priors can also play a more important role with many assets.  We need to consider two 
possible types of informative priors when there are many assets:  symmetric information and differential 
information.  In the discussion above, we denoted the variance of the prior as σ
2/h, where h can be 
interpreted as the length of the sample already observed.  Loosely speaking, a symmetric prior means that 
the investor has observed the equivalent of h dividends for all securities.  In this case, the prior covariance 
matrix equals Σ /h, where Σ  is the covariance matrix of dividends.  Of course, symmetric information is a 
fairly special case, and investors will typically have more information about some securities than others.  
With differential information, the prior covariance matrix does not have to be proportional to the dividend 
covariance matrix. 
  We briefly consider the general case of differential information.  Suppose that investors’ prior beliefs 
about expected dividends are MVN [δ
*, Ω ].  For a Bayesian investor, the posterior distribution for δ  at 
time t is MVN [mt, Π t], where 
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The mean of the distribution is a matrix-weighted-average of δ
* and  t d , with weights given by the 
inverses of the covariance matrices.  Importantly, the mean for a given asset will typically depend on the 
realized dividends for all assets and the covariance matrix does not have to be proportional to Σ .  Beliefs 
about dividends (the previous equations are for δ ) have the same mean; the predictive covariance matrix 
reflects both the true variance of dividends and uncertainty about the mean, or Π t + Σ . 
In the special case of symmetric information, the mean and variance of the posterior distribution 
simplify to   32 
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The mean is a scalar weighted-average of δ
* and  t d , and an investor’s belief about expected dividends for 
a given asset is unrelated to past dividends on other securities. 
The equilibrium pricing function remains similar in form to the basic model.  Specifically, the price 
at time t is 
ι γ −    v(t)   2     m
r
1
  = p t t ,                     ( 4 5 )  
where v(t) is a deterministic N× N matrix that plays the role of f(t) in the original model.  Once again, the 
properties of prices and returns depend on the behavior of mt.  Without going into too many details, we 
can draw two conclusions about the behavior of returns with informative priors: 
 
(a)  The cross-sectional correlation between deviations from the CAPM and lagged prices can be 
either positive or negative, depending on the strength of the prior and the relation between the prior mean 
and true expected dividends.  Recall that with a diffuse prior, the cross-sectional correlation is always 
negative and investors appear to react too strongly to realized dividends.  With an informative prior, 
however, investors can appear to update too slowly because they place less weight on the data and more 
on their prior beliefs. 
To give a concrete example, suppose that the true mean of the dividend process is δ , an N× 1 vector.  
Investors have symmetric priors and cannot distinguish among the assets, meaning that they have the 
same prior mean for every asset, or δ  ~
s N[δ
*ι , Σ /h], where δ
* is a scalar and ι  is a vector of ones.  To 
make matters simple, assume that the prior beliefs are correct on average, so that δ
* equals the cross-
sectional average of δ .  Under these assumptions, it can be shown that the expected cross-sectional 
covariance between deviations from the CAPM and lagged price equals   33 
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where var(ε i) is the residual variance when the asset’s dividend is regressed on the market dividend (see 
eq. 35), and  ) ( var i ε  denotes the cross-sectional average.  The cross-sectional covariance can be either 
positive or negative depending on the strength of the prior (the parameter h) and the cross-sectional 
variance of δ .  Qualitatively, these results are intuitive.  When investors have weak prior beliefs (h is 
small), they appear to react too strongly to realized dividends and the price-reversal effect described in 
Section 5 dominates.  On the other hand, with strong prior beliefs, investors rely less heavily on the data 
and might appear to react too slowly to new information. 
 
(b)  In Section 5, we showed that estimation risk simply ‘scales up’ the return covariance matrix 
when investors have diffuse priors.  This result does not have to hold with differential information.  In the 
general model, the true conditional covariance matrix of returns is given by 
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The matrix Mt maps unexpected dividends into unexpected returns.  The identity matrix, I, gives the 
immediate effect that unexpected dividends have on returns, and the second term gives the effect that 
unexpected dividends have on prices.  The subjective covariance matrix of returns is: 
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The difference between the subjective and true covariance matrices is that the predictive covariance, Π t + 
Σ , enters eq. (49). 
Parameter uncertainty affects both the true and subjective distributions through the matrix Mt+1.  In 
general, the subjective and true covariance matrices will not be proportional to each other, nor will they 
be proportional to the covariance matrix when the dividend process is known.  As a result, estimation risk   34 
affects subjective and true market betas differently, and both differ from market betas with perfect 
information.  Consider, for example, a simple model with two assets, a low-information and a high-
information security.  Specifically, assume the investor has previously observed L periods of dividends 
for the low-information security and H > L periods of dividends for the high-information security.  In this 
case, it can be shown that parameter uncertainty increases the beta of the low-information security.  
Further, the subjective beta is greater than the true beta, implying that the true (observable) beta does not 
fully capture the risk perceived by investors. 
 
In summary, informative priors can be important for the way parameter uncertainty affects 
equilibrium prices and returns.  Our basic conclusions about predictability and market efficiency, 
however, continue to hold. 
 
6.2. Renewal of estimation risk 
  Perhaps the most obvious limitation of our model is that estimation risk steadily diminishes over 
time.  As time passes, investors accumulate information and their beliefs converge to the true process.  
The reason is simple:  we have assumed that the dividend process is fixed, so investors never ‘lose’ 
information.  In reality, the economy evolves over time and a more realistic model would allow the 
dividend process to change.  In this section, we extend the model to incorporate unobservable shocks to 
the true parameters which periodically renew estimation risk.  We focus on the model with a single risky 
asset because the section is most applicable to the time-series properties of aggregate returns.  At the 
microeconomic level, firms continually appear and disappear from the stock market, and it is not clear 
that the long-run implications of estimation risk are relevant for the behavior of individual stocks. 
  There are many ways to prevent estimation risk from vanishing in the limit.  Here, we have chosen a 
particularly simple form of ‘renewal’ to illustrate the ideas.  The model remains the same with one 
exception:  we now assume that the true mean of the dividend process fluctuates over time at known, 
fixed intervals.  Specifically, every K periods the mean is re-drawn from a normal distribution with mean 
δ
* and variance 
2
s σ .  Thus, the model is essentially a sequence of short ‘regimes’ that look like our basic   35 
model truncated after K periods.  We have analyzed alternative models in which (1) the length of the 
intervals is random rather than fixed and (2) the true mean of the dividend process follows a persistent 
process.  The qualitative conclusions from these models appear to be similar. 
After an infinite number of periods, it is clear that investors would learn the distribution from which 
the short-run mean is drawn.  Therefore, in the limit, investors’ priors at the beginning of each regime 
would be  ]   , [   N
2
s
* σ δ .  Although we analyze these priors as a special case, we do not think that it is either 
the most realistic or most interesting scenario because it represents an extreme amount of learning.   
Instead, we consider the more general beliefs  ]   , [   N
2
h
* σ δ , which have the same mean as the actual 
distribution but not necessarily the same variance.  Thus, we assume that investors have observed the 
process long enough to know long-run expected dividends, even though they cannot observe short-run 
changes in the process.  Permitting the variances to be different can be justified on several grounds. 
First, we are trying to capture the idea that the economy moves though periods of high and low 
growth that cannot be perfectly observed.  These periods might cover many years, so learning about the 
switching process – and its variance – is likely to be slow.  Second, we have made the artificial 
assumption that the mean is repeatedly drawn from the same distribution.  The economy undoubtedly 
moves through periods of relative stability and periods of rapid change, and the variance of shocks to 
expected dividends is likely to change over time.  If investors cannot observe changes in volatility, then 
their current estimate of the volatility will not be perfect.  Finally, alternative assumptions about the 
evolution of the true mean do not necessarily have the property that the prior variance ever converges to 
the true variance.
11  We abstract from these issues, and take the more expeditious approach of simply 
permitting the prior variance to be different from 
2
s σ . 
  The pricing function is similar to the price in the basic model.  The renewal model consists of a 
sequence of intervals with fixed expected dividends, and investors do not observe the current draw of the 
                                                   
11 For example, suppose the dividend mean δ t follows a random walk, dividends have conditional variance σ
2, and 
the shocks to δ t are uncorrelated with dividends and have variance
2
s σ .  In the long-run, investors beliefs about δ t 
will be N[mt, 
2
h σ ], where 
2
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short-run mean, δ k.  As discussed above, investors’ priors at the beginning of each interval are  ]   , [   N
2
h
* σ δ .  
For notational convenience, let  s /    
2 2
s σ = σ  and  h /    
2 2
h σ = σ , and assume for simplicity that investors are 
risk neutral.  Realized dividends during the current interval provide no information about payoffs after the 
end of the interval, so beliefs about those payoffs always have mean δ
*.  Therefore, the price at the 
beginning of every regime equals δ
*/r, the value of expected dividends in perpetuity.  After t periods in 
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identical to eq. (38).  Thus, price equals 
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where AFK-t is an annuity factor for K-t periods.  Not surprisingly, the time-series properties of prices and 
returns once again depend on the behavior of mt.  It is straightforward to show that excess, or unexpected, 
returns are given by 
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The term in parentheses is simply unexpected dividends, which have an immediate effect on unexpected 
returns (the ‘1’ in brackets) and an indirect effect on prices (with the multiplier AFk-t-1/(t+h+1)). 
  The analysis of predictability with renewal is more complicated than in our basic model.  In 
particular, now that the short-run mean is random, we have to distinguish between expectations that are 
conditional on the current mean and expectations that treat the parameter as random.  It turns out that a 
combination of the two seems to be relevant for empirical tests (see the simulations below).  At time t 
(interpreted as t periods into the current regime), the unexpected return has true mean 
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which follows immediately from eq. (52).  As in our basic model, the true unexpected return is negatively   37 
related to past dividends and prices.  Consequently, taking the value of δ k as given, the covariance 
between excess returns and lagged prices equals 
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which is negative.  We refer to this expression as the ‘conditional covariance’ because it regards the short-
run mean as fixed.  The equation is very similar to our previous results with informative priors, except 
that the covariance is attenuated because price fluctuations are less pronounced (the price always returns 
at the end of the regime to δ
*/r).  Therefore, in one sense, the effects of estimation risk documented above 
remain the same even in the long-run:  the true and subjective distributions are different, leading to price 
reversals. 
Unfortunately, things are not quite so simple.  Although the conditional covariance does not depend 
on δ k, the ‘unconditional covariance’ – which regards the short-run mean as random – will nonetheless 
differ from eq. (54).
12  Specifically, the unconditional covariance equals 
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The sign of the unconditional covariance depends on the relative magnitudes of s and h.  Recall that σ
2/s 
is the true variance of δ k while σ
2/h is the prior variance.  Therefore, the unconditional covariance is 
negative when the prior variance is greater than the true (h < s), but positive when the prior variance is 
less.  When investors believe that the variance of shocks to expected dividends is high, they are relatively 
sensitive to realized dividends and the price-reversal effect of estimation risk shows up both conditionally 
and unconditionally.  On the other hand, if the short-run mean is more variable than investors believe, 
                                                   
12 In statistical terms, the expected conditional covariance does not equal the unconditional covariance because 
the conditional means of the variables move together over time.   38 
they tend to be surprised by the large movements in expected dividends and require many observations to 
update their beliefs.  Consequently, returns exhibit patterns of continuation or momentum.  The cutoff 
value occurs when investors have exactly the right beliefs about the variance of δ k, or when s = h.  In this 
case, the unconditional covariance between excess returns and lagged prices is exactly zero. 
Thus, we have two results on predictability in the renewal model:  (1) the conditional covariance is 
always negative, regardless of the relative magnitudes of s and h, and (2) the unconditional covariance 
depends on whether h is less than or greater than s.  The fact that the conditional covariance is negative 
implies immediately that excess returns are predictable, but it is not obvious to us whether the 
unconditional or conditional covariance is more relevant for standard empirical tests.
13  An empirical test 
depends on the observed sample, and implicitly conditions on the sample value (or values) of the mean 
parameter δ k.  This observation suggests that the conditional variance might be most relevant.  Indeed, 
take a particularly simple case in which the observed sample covers only one regime.  Regardless of the 
value of δ k, the covariance between unexpected returns and prices is expected to be negative; the 
correlation in this case corresponds directly to the conditional covariance.
14  On the other hand, if a 
sample covers multiple regimes, the empiricist implicitly conditions on several values of δ k and our 
simple formula for the conditional variance no longer represents the population counterpart of the 
estimate.  To muddy the waters further, if the empiricist suspects that a change in regime occurs and adds 
a dummy variable to the regression, or focuses on subperiod regressions, then the sample covariance will 
correspond once again to the conditional variance.  However, it is not common to include regime 
dummies in predictive regressions, nor is it easy to identify regime changes.  Rather than speculate 
further, we use simulations to explore the sample covariance with renewal. 
 
6.3. Simulations 
                                                   
13 Some additional explanation might be useful.  A predictive regression for returns that includes regime dummies 
would estimate the conditional covariance, and can therefore detect the price reversals.  Alternatively, the price 
reversals can be picked up by estimating within-regime covariances. 
14 We stress that this is not a survival bias or a so-called ‘peso problem.’  We expect to see a negative correlation 
for any value of δ k because the true correlation is negative.   39 
To investigate the ‘steady-state’ effects of estimation risk with renewal, we simulate the model 2500 
times and examine the predictability of returns.  To make the model more realistic, the simulations 
assume that dividends follow a geometric random walk with time-varying growth.  Specifically, 
dividends follow the process 
ln dt+1 = gk + ln dt + ε t+1,                     ( 5 6 )  
where ε t+1 ~ N[0, σ
2] and gk is randomly drawn every K periods from a normal distribution with mean g
* 
and variance σ
2/s.  The simulations normalize the initial dividend to equal one, the discount rate equals 
0.12,  σ  = 0.10, and the long-run growth rate g
* equals 0.03.  These parameters are chosen to be 
reasonably close to actual values, interpreting a period in the model as one year.  In comparison, the 
average annual return on the CRSP value-weighted index equals 12.5% for the period 1926 through 1997, 
and Brennan and Xia (1998) report that the average real growth rate in dividends equals 1.6%, with a 
standard deviation of 12.9%, over the period 1871-1996.  The simulations estimate predictive regressions 
using roughly 75 years of data, again taken to be similar to a typical study.  We report results for several 
combinations of the parameters s, h, and K.  These parameters determine the true variance in short-run 
growth rates, the variance of investors’ priors, and the length of a regime, respectively.  The appendix 
describes the Bayesian inference problem for this model. 
  Table 1 reports the results of the simulations.  Specifically, the table shows the average slope 
coefficient and t-statistic when excess returns are regressed on lagged dividend yield.
15  An important 
complication arises because the slope coefficient in these regressions suffers from a significant small-
sample bias (see Stambaugh, 1999, for a thorough discussion).  The bias is caused by the same 
phenomenon that biases autocorrelation estimates downward, but the coefficients in these regressions are 
biased upward, giving the appearance of more predictability.  To help reduce the effects of the bias, we 
also report bias-adjusted slope coefficients using the results of Stambaugh (1999).
16  In addition, the table 
                                                   
15 We focus on predictability here, but other moments of the return distribution are also affected by estimation 
risk.  This might be a useful area of future research. 
16 To derive the bias, Stambaugh makes several assumptions about the return and dividend processes that do not 
hold in our model (e.g., dividend yields are AR(1) and returns are homoskedastic).  Indeed, Table 1 shows that with 
perfect information, the bias adjustment tends to correct too much (the corrected slopes are negative not zero).  To   40 
reports results when investors perfectly observe the dividend process.  The difference between the bias-
adjusted coefficients with and without perfect information gives an estimate of the predictability caused 
by estimation risk. 
Table 1 shows that estimation risk can induce predictability even in steady state.  The results suggest 
that the negative conditional covariance between returns and lagged prices tends to dominate the 
regressions.  Even when investors know both the mean and variance of the distribution from which the 
growth rate is drawn (h = s), the slope coefficient in the dividend yield regression is positive.  For 
example, with two regimes over the 75 years, the average slope coefficient ranges from 1.06 to 1.52 for 
different values of h = s (see the diagonal terms in the last column).  With four regimes the slope 
coefficient ranges from 0.56 to 0.60, and with six regimes the slope ranges from 0.45 to 0.50.  The price 
reversal effect tends to be larger when the regimes are longer, and it becomes much more pronounced 
when investors’ prior variance is higher than actual variance.  With s = 49 and h = 16, the table shows that 
the slope coefficient varies between 1.98 and 2.24 for different values of K.  Cases in which s > h, so the 
subjective variance is greater than the true, are of particular interest because they show roughly how 
prices behave before we reach steady state (even if investors know 
2
s σ , the subjective variance of 
dividends is always greater than the true after a finite number of periods).  We believe that the 
evolutionary process is at least as relevant for empirical tests as the steady-state equilibrium. 
To add some perspective, the historical slope coefficient for the period 1941 to 1997 is 3.93 
(standard error of 1.73), before adjusting for bias, when the CRSP value-weighted return is regressed on 
its lagged dividend yield.  Although a more thorough study is necessary to draw detailed conclusions, the 
simulations provide preliminary evidence that estimation risk could account for a non-trivial portion of 
the predictability.  We hesitate to draw firm conclusions because the simulations do not (and probably 
cannot) capture all of the relevant properties of actual dividends and returns, and it is beyond the scope of 
                                                                                                                                                                    
confirm that the simulation evidence is not driven by problems with the bias-adjustment procedure, we perform an 
additional check.  We also estimate regressions using true unexpected returns, which always have conditional mean 
zero but otherwise have the same properties as excess returns.  The average slope coefficient in these regressions 
provides an alternative estimate of the bias.  These results support our conclusions in Table 1.   41 
the current paper to understand which set of parameter values best characterizes the historical stock 
market. 
The table also shows that return continuation, or a negative slope coefficient in the dividend yield 
regressions, is possible if investors’ prior variance is smaller than the true.  This case corresponds to a 
situation in which the economy is changing more dramatically than investors realize.  Investors require 
many dividend observations until their beliefs ‘catch up’ with the actual changes, which creates 
persistence in expected returns. 
Finally, adding a regime dummy variable to the regressions produces an estimate of the conditional 
covariance.  In results not reported, the average bias-adjusted slope coefficient is approximately 1.47 with 
two regimes, 2.00 with four regimes, and 2.55 with six regimes.  These values are not sensitive to the 
values of h and s, presumably because h and s affect the covariance in the numerator and the variance in 
the denominator by similar magnitudes.  Although we believe these issues deserve a more complete 
treatment, we simply note here that the simulations confirm, in substance, our earlier results.  Even in 
steady state, parameter uncertainty can be a source of predictability. 
 
7. Summary and conclusions 
  Financial economists generally assume that, unlike themselves, investors know the means, variances, 
and covariances of the return or cashflow process.  Practitioners do not have this luxury.  To apply the 
elegant framework of modern portfolio theory, they must estimate expected returns using whatever 
information is available.  As Black (1986) observes, however, the world is a noisy place and our 
observations are necessarily imprecise.  The estimation risk literature formalizes this problem.   
Surprisingly, this literature has had little impact on mainstream thinking about equilibrium asset pricing 
and market efficiency.  We believe that this is due, in large part, to its focus on the subjective beliefs of 
investors, rather than the true, or empirical, distribution of returns.  As we have emphasized throughout 
the paper, the subjective distribution of returns does not have to correspond to the empirical distribution 
even when investors are rational.   42 
  Our analysis shows that parameter uncertainty can significantly affect the time-series and cross-
sectional behavior of asset prices.  Prices in our model satisfy commonly accepted notions of market 
efficiency and rational expectations:  investors use all available information when making decisions and, 
in equilibrium, the perceived pricing function equals the true pricing function.  However, prices and 
returns violate standard tests of efficiency, suggesting that parameter uncertainty is likely to be important 
for characterizing an efficient market.  Although we do not argue that estimation risk necessarily explains 
specific asset-pricing anomalies, our results relate to several empirically-observed patterns in stock prices: 
 Return  predictability.  Empirical studies document time-varying expected stock returns, captured by 
variables like past returns, aggregate dividend yield, and aggregate book-to-market (e.g., Keim and 
Stambaugh, 1986; Fama and French, 1989; Kothari and Shanken, 1997).  These studies attribute variation 
in expected returns to changes in business conditions or to irrational investors.  We find that estimation 
risk can be a third source of return predictability.  In our basic model, expected returns are negatively 
related to past dividends and prices, and can actually be negative at times.  The price-reversal effects 
become more pronounced in long-horizon returns, consistent with the evidence of Fama and French 
(1988) and Poterba and Summers (1988).  In more elaborate models, parameter uncertainty could also 
give the appearance of underreaction or momentum in returns. 
 Volatility.  Leroy and Porter (1981) and Shiller (1981) derive bounds on the volatility of asset prices 
in an efficient market.  They conclude that prices ‘move too much to be justified by subsequent changes 
in dividends.’  Our findings suggest that estimation risk might help explain excess volatility.  Asset prices 
can reject the volatility bounds even though investors are rational and prices reflect all available 
information.  The volatility bounds can be viewed as tests of market efficiency only if investors have 
perfect knowledge of the dividend process.  In our simple model with IID dividends, price changes are 
completely uncorrelated with future dividends.  Thus, like the results on predictability, price volatility 
would suggest investor overreaction in the absence of estimation risk.  Asset prices can take long swings 
away from ‘fundamental’ value, which are eventually reversed, giving the appearance of fads or bubbles 
in stock prices.   43 
 CAPM.  Many empirical studies find that the CAPM does not completely describe the cross-section 
of expected returns.  Departures from the CAPM have been attributed to missing risk factors, irrational 
investors, or trading frictions.  We find that estimation risk provides an additional explanation.  When 
investors must estimate expected dividends, returns will typically deviate from the predictions of the 
CAPM even if investors attempt to hold mean-variance efficient portfolios.  Moreover, the deviations can 
be predictable, both cross-sectionally and in time series, with past dividends, prices, and returns.  Our 
results complement previous studies on asset pricing with incomplete information (e.g., Williams, 1977). 
  The fact that estimation risk might explain these patterns does not, of course, mean that it does.  The 
impact of estimation risk on actual prices is obviously an empirical issue, which we plan to explore in 
future work.  Clarkson and Thompson (1990) find evidence that market betas reflect differences in the 
quality of available information about firms, consistent with differentially-informative priors.  However, 
our analysis suggests the possibility of much more general effects on volatility and predictability, at both 
the individual-security and aggregate-market levels.  The central question becomes:  To what extent do 
rational forecasts deviate from expectations based on perfect knowledge of the underlying cashflow 
process?  We believe from casual observation and reading of the financial press that these deviations 
could be quite large. 
To assess market efficiency in light of estimation risk, the researcher may in effect need to mimic the 
Bayesian-updating process of rational investors.  This is probably not an easy task:  it would necessarily 
require some judgment about what constitutes a ‘reasonable’ prior and an examination of rational 
forecasts generated by a range of such priors.  Fama (1971) has emphasized that empirical tests of market 
efficiency actually test a joint hypothesis of market efficiency and an assumed model of expected returns.  
Our study suggests that empirical tests also require an additional assumption about investors’ prior 
beliefs.  Although the role of prior beliefs and learning is typically ignored, these considerations may be 
just as important in disentangling behavioral and rational explanations for empirical anomalies. 
  It is important to distinguish between ‘true’ uncertainty in the economy and estimation risk.  True 
uncertainty concerns economic conditions or events that could not be predicted even with complete   44 
knowledge of the underlying economic process.  In contrast, estimation risk refers to subjective 
uncertainty about some relevant characteristic of the economy that is already largely determined at the 
time of the forecast, but not directly observable.  Although the line between subjective and true is not 
always clear, the distinction can be important for asset pricing.  As we have seen, uncertainty about a 
predetermined characteristic (expected dividends in our model) gives rise to price-related predictability in 
returns, since resolution of this uncertainty is negatively related to past mistakes.  In contrast, resolution 
of true uncertainty will be unrelated to past information. 
As an example of subjective uncertainty, consider the rate of productivity growth in the United 
States, which has recently received much attention.  Market analysts debate whether past technological 
innovations allow the economy to grow more quickly.  The question, then, is whether productivity growth 
has already accelerated; the change in the economy is presumed to have already taken place, but it is 
unknown.  Similarly,  Lewis (1989) argues that demand for U.S. currency shifted in the early 1980s, but 
investors could not immediately learn about this change.  At the firm level, uncertainty about the demand 
for a firm’s product or service would generate estimation risk.  Consumers’ preferences, and consequently 
true expected demand, might be predetermined, but ‘noise’ prevents investors from precisely measuring 
the true probability distribution of demand.  In all of these examples, the underlying economic process 
cannot be perfectly observed. 
  We close with a few reflections on the relation between data mining and estimation risk.  In recent 
years, researchers and practitioners have become increasingly sensitive to the possibility that, with the 
intensive scrutiny of data common in investment research, ‘statistically significant’ return patterns can 
emerge even when returns are essentially random (see, for example, Lo and MacKinlay, 1990).  Thus, we 
might observe patterns that do not exist in the true underlying process.  Our analysis of estimation risk 
suggests a complementary concern.  With hindsight, we can discern patterns that existed in the true return 
process, but could not have been exploited at the time by rational investors.  Similar to the results of data 
snooping, these patterns would not be relevant for future investment decisions.  Unlike data snooping, 
however, the patterns can persist in the future because they are part of the true process.  This conclusion   45 
provides an alternative perspective on empirical anomalies.  For example, Fama (1998) argues that 
various long-horizon return anomalies in the literature are chance results, consistent with market 
efficiency.  He finds that ‘apparent overreaction to information is about as common as underreaction’ and, 
given data mining and other methodological concerns, concludes that the overall weight of the evidence is 
not compelling.  Our work reinforces this conclusion by demonstrating that reversals and continuations 
might be expected in an efficient market with estimation risk, not only as a random outcome of the data 
but as a feature of the actual process.   46 
Appendix 
 
  This appendix describes the Bayesian inference problem in the renewal model.  Dividends are 
assumed to follow a geometric random walk with a time-varying growth rate: 
ln dt+1 = gk + ln dt + ε t+1,                   ( A . 1 )  
where ε t+1 ~ N[0, σ
2] and gk is randomly drawn every K periods from a normal distribution with mean g
* 
and variance σ
2/s.  At the beginning of a regime, investors’ prior beliefs about gk are N[g
*, σ
2/h].  After t 
periods in a regime (t ≤  K), investors beliefs about gk are  ]   , c [ N
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The predictive belief about log dividends next period is normally distributed with mean ct + ln dt and 
variance [(t+h+1)/(t+h)]σ
2.  Actual dividends are log-normally distributed.  Converting the expectations 
about log dividends into actual dividends, and extending the results to any dividend in the next q periods, 
where t + q ≤  K (that is, dividends in the current regime), we have that the predictive distribution of 
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This equation fully takes into account the fact that changes in log dividends are correlated with changes in 
beliefs about the growth rate.  In other words, investors recognize that their beliefs, both the mean and the 
variance, will evolve over time.  After the end of the current regime, investors expect dividends to grow 
once again at the rate g
*, and the variance of the growth rate is σ
2/h.  Therefore, to derive beliefs about 
long-run dividends requires two steps:  first, take the expectation conditional on the realized dividend at 
the end of the current regime, dK, and then take the expectation conditional only on the current dividend, 
dt.  Details available on request. 
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Equilibrium price of the risky asset 
 
This figure illustrates a sample price path for the risky asset when the dividend process is known 
(‘fundamental value’ in the figure; see eq. 6 in the text) and when investors must estimate expected 
dividends (‘actual price’; see eq. 12 in the text).  The riskless rate is 0.05, dividends have true mean 0.05 
and standard deviation 0.10, and investors are risk-neutral.  Without estimation risk, the price of the risky 
asset is one.  With estimation risk, the price depends on average dividends, which we randomly select 
from a normal distribution. 
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Table 1 
Predictability in steady state 
 
We simulate the renewal model 2500 times.  Dividends are assumed to follow a geometric random walk with 
time-varying expected growth, where the short-run growth rate gk is randomly drawn every K periods from 
N[g*, σ
2/s].  Investors are risk neutral and have initial beliefs about gk at the beginning of each ‘regime’ equal 
to N[g*, σ
2/h].  In the simulations, r = 0.12, σ  = 0.10, and g* = 0.03.  The table reports results for various 
combinations of s, h, and K.  The table shows the average slope coefficient and t-statistic when excess returns 
are regressed on lagged dividend yield for roughly 75 years (approximate because we require the number of 
years to be divisible by K).  We also report bias-adjusted slope coefficients which correct for small-sample 
bias using the results of Stambaugh (1999). 
 
      Estimation  risk    Perfect information    Difference 
      h  h  h 
    s  16 25 49   16 25 49   16 25 49 
16  2.91 3.05 3.68   0.40 0.39 0.50   2.41 2.65 3.16 
25  3.31 3.57 4.41   0.37 0.31 0.52   2.94 3.26 3.88  slope 
49  3.92 4.16 5.62   0.44 0.50 0.41   3.48 3.65 5.21 
16  0.78  0.32 -0.53  -0.28 -0.29 -0.16   1.06  0.60 -0.37 
25  1.16 0.84 0.15    -0.28  -0.34  -0.11   1.44 1.18 0.25 
bias-
adj 
slope 49  1.77 1.39 1.31    -0.21  -0.14  -0.21   1.98 1.53 1.52 
16  1.02 0.80 0.53   0.25 0.25 0.28   0.77 0.55 0.25 
25  1.15 0.98 0.71   0.23 0.19 0.18   0.92 0.78 0.53 
2 regimes 
(K = 38) 
t-stat 
49  1.34 1.14 0.94   0.11 0.14 0.13   1.23 1.00 0.81 
16  2.56 2.44 1.97   0.37 0.30 0.34   2.19 2.15 1.64 
25  3.34 3.29 3.61   0.32 0.32 0.28   3.02 2.97 3.32  slope 
49  4.01 4.21 5.25   0.35 0.35 0.27   3.65 3.85 4.98 
16  0.29 -0.56 -2.95  -0.27 -0.33 -0.29   0.56 -0.23 -2.66 
25  1.06  0.26 -1.36  -0.29 -0.31 -0.34   1.35  0.57 -1.01 
bias-
adj 
slope 49  1.72 1.17 0.24    -0.27  -0.27  -0.35   1.99 1.43 0.60 
16  0.62 0.38 0.05   0.24 0.20 0.22   0.38 0.18  -0.17 
25  0.86 0.59 0.32   0.18 0.18 0.16   0.69 0.41 0.16 
4 regimes 
(K = 19) 
t-stat 
49  1.05 0.80 0.56   0.14 0.14 0.11   0.91 0.66 0.46 
16  2.59 1.94 1.41   0.27 0.32 0.24   2.33 1.62 1.17 
25  3.65 3.44 3.65   0.31 0.28 0.25   3.34 3.16 3.40  slope 
49  4.38 4.87 5.80   0.29 0.30 0.26   4.09 4.57 5.54 
16  0.16 -1.35 -4.15  -0.33 -0.26 -0.34   0.49 -1.08 -3.81 
25  1.22  0.14 -1.95  -0.27 -0.31 -0.34   1.49  0.45 -1.61 
bias-
adj 
slope 49  1.94 1.56 0.18    -0.29  -0.27  -0.32   2.24 1.83 0.50 
16  0.48 0.19  -0.05   0.17 0.20 0.16   0.31  -0.01  -0.20 
25  0.42 0.45 0.22   0.16 0.15 0.13   0.57 0.31 0.08 
6 regimes 
(K = 13) 
t-stat 
49  0.90 0.71 0.44   0.11 0.10 0.10   0.79 0.60 0.34 
 